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Abstract
The vision of smart homes is rapidly becoming a reality, as the Internet of Things
and other smart devices are deployed widely. Although smart devices o↵er convenience, they also create a significant management problem for home residents. With
a large number and variety of devices in the home, residents may find it difficult to
monitor, or even locate, devices. A central controller that brings all the home’s smart
devices under secure management and a unified interface would help homeowners and
residents track and manage their devices.
We envision a solution called the SPLICEcube whose goal is to detect smart
devices, locate them in three dimensions within the home, securely monitor their
network traffic, and keep an inventory of devices and important device information
throughout the device’s lifecycle. The SPLICEcube system consists of the following
components: 1) a main cube, which is a centralized hub that incorporates and expands on the functionality of the home router, 2) a database that holds network data,
and 3) a set of support cubelets that can be used to extend the range of the network
and assist in gathering network data.
To deliver this vision of identifying, securing, and managing smart devices, we introduce an architecture that facilitates intelligent research applications (such as network anomaly detection, intrusion detection, device localization, and device firmware
updates) to be integrated into the SPLICEcube. In this thesis, we design a generalpurpose Wi-Fi architecture that underpins the SPLICEcube. The architecture specifii

ically showcases the functionality of the cubelets (Wi-Fi frame detection, Wi-Fi frame
parsing, and transmission to cube), the functionality of the cube (routing, reception
from cubelets, information storage, data disposal, and research application integration), and the functionality of the database (network data storage). We build and
evaluate a prototype implementation to demonstrate our approach is scalable to accommodate new devices and extensible to support di↵erent applications. Specifically,
we demonstrate a successful proof-of-concept use of the SPLICEcube architecture by
integrating a security research application: an “Inside-Outside detection” system that
classifies an observed Wi-Fi device as being inside or outside the home.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
With the explosion of the Internet of Things (IoT), more smart devices are rapidly
entering the home. Light bulbs regulate their brightness based on the available natural light or the current use of the room. TVs connect to the Internet to stream
video or music. Refrigerators monitor food quantities and maintain shopping lists.
Thermostats are equipped with Wi-Fi and allow residents to remotely control temperatures. Virtual assistants are networked and often perform tasks and answer questions
by accessing the Internet. Doorlocks recognize when residents are near and automatically grant access to the home [22]. IoT is becoming a staple in many homes, and
almost half of U.S. households will use a smart home device by 2025 [25].
Smart devices in the home provide unprecedented convenience and comfort by
automating tasks and allowing remote access, but they also create a management
challenge for residents. Without a way to track and monitor the devices, residents
may be unaware of a device’s communication patterns or even its location in the home.
An adversary could plant a rogue device inside or near the home that eavesdrops on
conversations. A device that the resident initially installed in the home could be
compromised and communicating with external, malicious sources. To avoid these
security exploits, it is important for a resident to be able to easily access and monitor
1
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all the devices in the home.

Section 1.1

Problem Statement
There is currently no system to support residents who install a multitude of di↵erent
types of smart devices in their home, and who desire privacy, security, and usability.
To realize a vision of a manageable and secure smart home environment, we must
bring all the home’s smart devices under a secure and unified management interface,
that is underpinned by a scalable and extensible architecture.
Specifically, the implementation of such an architecture needs to be able to capture
network data across the smart home, parse the network data for desired information,
consolidate this information into a central repository, and allow applications to use
the stored information to securely manage the devices within the home. The number
and type of devices are expected to continue to increase within the smart home, so the
architecture should scale with network activity and be extensible to allow di↵erent
network technologies and di↵erent types of applications.

Section 1.2

Proposed Solution
We envision a system called the SPLICEcube (SPLICE = Security and Privacy in the
Lifecycle of IoT for Consumer Environments) whose goal is to detect smart devices,
locate them in three dimensions within the home, securely monitor their network
traffic, and keep an inventory of devices and important device information throughout
the device’s lifecycle.
The SPLICEcube is composed of

2
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• a main cube, a centralized hub that incorporates and expands on the functionality of the home router, and
• a database that holds network data, and
• a set of support cubelets to extend the range of the cube and to assist in gathering network data in the home.
The SLPICEcube system can be deployed in a home, as shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: SPLICEcube System in a Home. The cube and database are located
centrally, and the cubelets are dispersed throughout the home.
Our vision is for the SPLICEcube to be able to detect smart devices, securely
monitor their network traffic, and keep an inventory of devices and important device information throughout the device’s lifecycle. To function as a home’s central
security and privacy controller and to manage devices throughout their lifecycles, the
SPLICEcube must have a comprehensive and robust array of capabilities.
To develop this broad array of capabilities, we envision the SPLICEcube to be able
to seamlessly incorporate intelligent research applications that tackle di↵erent tech3
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nical questions and consequently expand the functionality of the system. Researchers
write these applications and work with the SPLICEcube developer to integrate the applications with the SPLICEcube. Smart-home residents who deploy the SPLICEcube
in their home then use these applications to secure and manage their smart-home
environment. Hence, we envision that the SPLICEcube serves as both a research
platform for researchers to test applications and an end-user platform for residents to
manage their smart home.
Below are some examples of applications that could be incorporated into the
SPLICEcube to enhance its functionality.
• Device Localization: an application to detect the physical location of a device
inside or near the home. Several research approaches exist that leverage di↵erent characteristics of device transmissions to estimate location. For example,
Soltanaghaei et al. propose multipath triangulation, a method that extracts
features such as angle of arrival, angle of departure, and relative time of flight,
from multipath signals to help triangulate the position of the transmitter relative to the receiver [42]. In contrast, the Inside-Out Detection system proposed
by Gralla uses received signal strength indicator (RSSI) data from device WiFi transmissions to classify the device as inside or outside the boundary of a
residence [14].
• Network Anomaly Detection: this application recognizes if a device is deviating
from its expected behavior, such as if it is communicating with an unrecognized
cloud service. Two approaches to anomaly detection are learning-based and
specification-based. A learning-based approach sni↵s network traffic, identifies
and extracts certain parameters, makes a model of (learns) the “normal” behavior, and finally compares the behavior of the running system with the one
defined by the model [12]. For example, IoTHound uses an unsupervised learn4
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ing method to analyze properties of the network traffic to 1) identify IoT device
types based on extracted data, and 2) detect deviations from normal network
behavior by monitoring over time [3]. In contrast, a specification-based approach
does not learn but instead uses specifications, parameters, and measurements
of the system, that are often stipulated by the manufacturer, to identify when a
system behaves unexpectedly [12]. Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) is
an embedded software standard that allows IoT device manufacturers to define
device specifications, including the intended communication patterns for their
device when it connects to the network [23]. The BoDMitM (Botnet Detection
and Mitigation System For Home Router Based on Manufacture Usage Description), monitors network traffic and forwards any traffic that violates the device’s
MUD policies to an intrusion detection system, which subsequently attempts
to identify the attack vector [15].
• Device Firmware Update: a method to securely deploy new firmware on multiple, heterogeneous devices. Nilsson et al. present a wireless firmware update
protocol that provides data integrity, data authentication, data confidentiality,
and freshness and uses a single central unit to communicate with a number of
end nodes [32].
• Cube Interface Design: an application to make the cube interface user-friendly
and may include a front-end GUI and a mobile application.
There must be an architecture foundation that underpins the SPLICEcube and
facilitates the integration of these research applications. For example, to accomplish network anomaly detection, there must be a way for the system to establish a
baseline for device network activity (whether from network observations or from a
specification such as MUD) and then recognize anomalous behavior. To accomplish
device localization, there must be a way for the system to capture device activity and
5
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estimate physical distance to the device or leverage known observation locations to
implement triangulation or trilateration. Although the cube (as a central hub) and
cubelets (as sni↵ers) joint system is apt for exploring these technical questions, several questions arise. What information should the cubelets capture? How should the
cubelets communicate with the cube? How often should this communication occur?
Should the cube analyze all information or should some intelligence be distributed to
the cubelets? In what format should information be stored?
To enable the SPLICEcube vision, we designed and built a general-purpose Wi-Fi
architecture and database for the SPLICEcube that also provides a foundation for
further research development.

Section 1.3

Contributions
The key contributions of this thesis are
• the development of a general-purpose Wi-Fi architecture and database that
underpins the SPLICEcube and facilitates the integration of intelligent research
applications, and
• a successful proof-of-concept use of the SPLICEcube architecture through the
integration of the Inside-Outside detection system, an application that classifies
an observed Wi-Fi device as being inside or outside the home.

6

Chapter 2

Background
Since the architecture proposed in this thesis is tailored to the smart home environment, it is important to have an understanding of home IoT, the key stakeholders
that interact with the SPLICEcube system, and the attributes that the architecture
must satisfy to be useful in a smart home context. We address these topics in this
chapter.

Section 2.1

Home IoT
We draw on Kotz and Peters’ following definitions of IoT, smart things, and smart
environment for the purposes of this thesis [21].
• “IoT refers to the Internet of Things, a vision in which everyday objects become
smart things through the inclusion of digital electronics and a network interface
that allows them to communicate with other Things and remote servers on the
Internet.”
• “Smart things typically have the ability to interact with their environment
through sensors and actuators. They vary in size, they may be stationary or
7
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mobile, and they may or may not have a human user interface.” In this thesis,
we use smart device as a synonym for smart thing.
• “A smart environment is an environment involving a collection of smart things
that interact with the environment, with its human occupants, with each other,
and with remote services.” In this thesis, we focus on a smart home, a smart
environment that is used as a residence.
Incorporating smart devices in the home has benefits, but it also poses significant
privacy, security, and usability risks.
• Privacy: The home is inherently a private space where actions, conversations,
and living patterns are typically shielded from outsiders. Smart home devices
that can listen, record, remember habits, and communicate over the Internet
diminish the barrier between the inside of the home and the outside world.
These devices introduce many interfaces through which private information can
escape the home.
• Security: Having a large number and variety of devices makes it challenging for
a home resident to manage these devices. A lack of awareness about devices
can introduce security vulnerabilities. If a resident cannot remember or is not
alerted when a device is due for a firmware upgrade, an adversary could take
advantage of outdated components and hijack the device. If a device does become compromised, an adversary could run bots or install a crypto-miner on
the device, causing it deviate from its regular communication patterns. Additionally, an adversary could install their own physical devices near the home
such as an access point that residents may unknowingly connect to, or a device
that eavesdrops on residents’ conversation or even records residents’ actions.

8
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• Usability: Introducing a diverse set of smart devices to the home also makes it
more difficult for the resident to use the devices. Di↵erent devices may utilize
di↵erent communication protocols or have di↵erent configuration settings. To
harness the full functionality of devices and take full advantage of the benefits
that smart homes o↵er, a resident must be knowledgeable about the state of
the smart home and have complete control of the devices within it.

Section 2.2

Key Stakeholders
In this section, we define the key stakeholders that interact with the SPLICEcube
system.
• SPLICEcube developer: a person writing code to develop the SPLICEcube.
They have access to and can modify the code for any of the di↵erent components
of the SPLICEcube system.
• Researcher: a person who is working on a research application and wishes to
integrate the application into the SPLICEcube. They do not have access to any
SPLICEcube code and cannot modify any of the SPLICEcube system components. They can communicate their research idea to the SPLICEcube developer, and the SPLICEcube developer can then modify the system to integrate
the application and subsequently allow the researcher to request network data
if necessary. Allowing only the SPLICEcube developer to access the code helps
maintain the integrity of the SPLICEcube system.
• Resident: a person living in a smart home. They do not have access to any
SPLICEcube code and cannot modify any of the SPLICEcube system components. They can use applications that are already designed to work with the
9
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SPLICEcube to secure and manage their smart home environment.

Section 2.3

Architecture Attributes
The proposed architecture is designed for an evolving, general smart home space. To
deliver this vision, we define two attributes that the architecture must satisfy.
First, the architecture must be scalable to accommodate increased network traffic and new devices. Di↵erent smart home environments may have di↵erent number
of existing devices, and the network traffic will vary by home. Additionally, residents may want to add more devices after the SPLICEcube has been installed in the
home, which may further increase network traffic. The architecture should be able to
accommodate various levels of network activity and efficiently manage network data.
Second, the architecture must be extensible to support di↵erent applications and
technologies. Since the SPLICEcube serves as a platform for researchers to deploy
and test research applications and as a platform for residents to manage their smart
home, the SPLICEcube must be flexible enough to incorporate such applications
into its existing framework or be easily extended to accommodate the application.
An extensible architecture enables the exploration and customization we envision,
when the SPLICEcube is used as a research platform. We focused on designing a
Wi-Fi architecture due to the pervasiveness of Wi-Fi as a communication protocol.
However, we realize that devices in the home use other protocols such as Bluetooth,
Zigbee, or Z-Wave. Additionally, other newer IoT protocols that are currently in
development may become increasingly popular. Although our proposed architecture
does not currently support these protocols, it could be extended to support such
additional technologies.

10

Chapter 3

Related Work
In this chapter we describe existing work that is similar to the SPLICEcube and that
is available commercially or has been described in publically available literature.

Section 3.1

Commercial
Smart home platforms such as Samsung SmartThings [41], Google Home Assistant [13], Amazon Alexa [1], and Apple HomeKit [4] let residents control smart-home
devices. These platforms, however, are mostly designed for residents to automate their
smart home and not for detailed network analysis. For example, these platforms allow
residents to remotely dim the smart lights or raise the smart thermostat’s temperature, but they do not alert the resident if the smart TV is deviating from its regular
communication behavior.
Commercial routers such as the Netgear Orbi mesh Wi-Fi system provide a friendly
web user interface that shows all the connected devices on the network and provides
some basic statistics about the network traffic [31]. These products, however, do not
provide robust, comprehensive applications for detailed network analysis.
Several commercial security products are available, but they have limited capa11

3.2 Literature

Related Work

bilities. Bitdefender BOX is a router designed to protect smart homes by blocking
malicious Internet traffic; in e↵ect, it is a consumer-grade firewall intrusion detection
and prevention device [7]. The Bull-Guard Dojo claims to protect home connected
IoT devices in the home from malware, viruses, and cyberattacks while keeping privacy intact [9]. Its capabilities are unclear, but appear limited to firewall and anomaly
detection.

Section 3.2

Literature
We focus our literature search on home hubs and security managers designed to
improve security or privacy for smart-home IoT devices.
The Databox is a personal networked device installed in the home and can access
a user’s personal data from a variety of sources – online, mobile, IoT [2]. Its focus,
however, is not on securing and managing smart home devices; instead, its primary
purpose is to protect the privacy of the user by securing personal data.
The IoT Inspector is an open-source software that captures network traffic and
provides visualizations of device activity [17, 19]. It is well-suited to analyze device
behavior and identify anomalous communication. It, however, does not have other
features that we envision for the SPLICEcube such as device localization and secure
device firmware upgrades.
The Home Manager is a software infrastructure tool that aims to provide usable
and secure management of cooperating IoT devices [6]. It has several capabilities including detecting devices, controlling devices, and adding and removing devices from
the network. Its proposed architecture, however, is limited to Zigbee communication.
Additionally, the Home Manager does not store device data and does not provide
applications such as network anomaly detection that could perform analysis of device
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behavior or communication patterns.
All the above tools mentioned are limited to their “out-of-the-box” functionality.
We found only one tool designed to allow integration of other research applications
for future development. Simpson et al. propose a central security manager that is
built on top of the smart home’s hub or gateway router [40]. The manager is aware
of the status of all devices in the home and of reported vulnerabilities. The authors
propose that additional modules can be built atop this manager to o↵er installation
of software updates, filter traffic, and strengthen authentication for devices. The
manager, however, can only observe communication to and from devices on the home
network and does not capture traffic that does not go through the router. Specifically,
it does not have helper devices (similar to the cubelets in the SPLICEcube system)
that can assist with network traffic capture.
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In this chapter we first provide a conceptual view of the proposed architecture that
describes how the various high-level components of the SPLICEcube system fit together. We follow with a detailed description of each component.

Section 4.1

Conceptual Architecture
The SPLICEcube system deploys within a smart home as an assembly of three components: a set of cubelets, the cube, and the database, as shown in Figure 4.1. Each
cubelet captures Wi-Fi traffic, parses the traffic for relevant features, and sends the
extracted features to the cube. In addition to acting as the home’s internet router,
the cube receives the parsed network information from the cubelets and communicates with the database to store the data as defined by the database schema. The
database holds the network data and can be queried by the cube if an application
requests data.
In the following sections of this chapter, we identify the requirements of each
component and explain how each component supports the scalability and extensibility
architecture attributes outlined in Section 2.3.
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Architecture. The SPLICEcube architecture consists of a
set of cubelets, the cube, and the database.

Section 4.2

Cubelets
As shown in Figure 4.2, each cubelet consists of three modules: capturer, parser, and
transmitter.
4.2.1. Capturer Module
A primary function of the cubelets is to detect devices that are inside or close to the
home. One of the ways to detect devices is to capture wireless traffic with a wireless
network sni↵er. To accomplish this task, the cubelet must contain an interface that
is capable of sniffing all Wi-Fi packets over-the-air. Although the interface will likely
only capture packets on one channel (unless channel hopping is implemented), we
envision the interface to be dual-band, i.e., capable of sniffing on both the 2.4 GHz and
5 GHz Wi-Fi bands, so that the SPLICEcube developer can choose which channel(s)
to sni↵.
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Figure 4.2: Cubelet Architecture. Each cubelet consists of the capturer, parser,
and transmitter modules.
4.2.2. Parser Module
A Wi-Fi frame contains a large amount of data, some of which may be unnecessary
to retain. The parser module parses each captured frame and extracts relevant fields.
4.2.3. Transmitter Module
The next step after the frame parsing and extraction is to send the collected information to the cube for storage in a database. To support this communication, a cubelet
must contain a network interface that can send data over a network. This may be a
second Wi-Fi interface, or Ethernet, for example.
4.2.4. Support of Architecture Attributes
To facilitate scalability, we envision the cubelet’s modules to run concurrently. This
structure permits efficient processing of network data even in busy network conditions or with growing number of devices. For example, even if there is high network
activity and the parser module is busy parsing frames, the transmission module can
execute in parallel and will not be indefinitely blocked by the parser. To further promote scalability, we envision two separate network interfaces, one for the capture and
16
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another for the transmission, to avoid time-sharing the network hardware. Although
the capture and the transmission could theoretically occur on the same interface,
separating them will allow the system to scale responsively by not missing packets
during capture, especially during high network activity.
To facilitate extensibility, we divide and encapsulate the cubelet tasks into discrete modules. This division allows the SPLICEcube developer to undertake specific
modifications to modules without revising the entire architecture. For example, if the
SPLICEcube developer chooses to modify the module used to capture Wi-Fi packets,
they can do so without manipulating other modules. To further support extensibility,
additional modules can be added as functionality grows. For example, we can imagine
adding a module to the cubelet that captures Bluetooth traffic, parses the data, and
transmits to the cube, without changing the overall SPLICEcube architecture.

Section 4.3

Cube
As shown in Figure 4.3, the cube consists of the following modules: router, reception,
storage, disposal, and integration.
4.3.1. Router Module
The cube acts as the home router and provides a Wi-Fi network for clients to join.
Currently, this is the only function of the router module in the proposed architecture,
but we discuss additional potential capabilities in Section 7.2.1. We envision each
cubelet and each home Wi-Fi device to be connected to the cube’s network. The WiFi network must be protected by a strong security protocol to protect the residents’
information on the network. Appropriate software is required to support routing.
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Figure 4.3: Cube Architecture. The cube consists of the router, reception, storage,
disposal, and integration modules.
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4.3.2. Reception Module
The cube receives parsed data from the cubelets. As mentioned, we envision this
cubelet-cube communication to occur over a network, so the cube must contain a
network interface to receive transmissions from the cubelets.
4.3.3. Storage Module
Once the cube receives a cubelet transmission, it must store the information for future
access. To store the data, the storage module communicates with a database that
holds all received network information. We discuss the database in further detail in
Section 4.4.
4.3.4. Disposal Module
Since storage on any device is finite, there must be a way to manage the database
size and archive old data. We envision the disposal module to periodically upload
some data from the database to cloud storage because storing data in the cloud is
inexpensive. The frequency of upload depends on the variables below.
• Device storage: If the device that hosts the database has more available storage,
then the database can store more data, and data can be migrated to the cloud
less frequently.
• Network conditions: If there is high network activity, then the database will fill
up more rapidly and data will need to be uploaded to the cloud more frequently.
• Application requirements: Certain applications may require data to be stored
locally for a certain amount of time, which will limit the upload frequency.
Once the data has been uploaded to the cloud, we envision that the disposal module
deletes this data from the database. To minimize cloud storage costs, the disposal
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module can also be extended to permanently delete some data from the cloud once a
certain size threshold is exceeded.
4.3.5. Integration Module
As discussed in Section 1.2, one of the primary motivations of the SPLICEcube system
is to serve as a platform for research development. The vision is to let researchers
leverage the SPLICEcube’s general-purpose architecture to easily test their security
and privacy research applications in a real environment.
The integration module must have an API that applications can use to request
data. The applications may be running internally on the cube or remotely. If an application is running remotely and requires access to data, we envision application-cube
communication to occur over a network (similar to cubelet-cube communication).
4.3.6. Support of Architecture Attributes
We envision the cube’s modules to run concurrently. A concurrent structure facilitates
scalability since the modules can run in parallel. For example, if the cube’s reception
module is busy receiving a large amount of data, the integration module can still
execute once the CPU switches threads, instead of waiting for the entire chunk of
data to be received.
Similar to how the cubelet’s modules can be extended, we encapsulate the cube’s
tasks into modules to promote extensibility, so that individual tasks can be modified
easily. For example, the SPLICEcube developer can modify the thread underpinning the integration module to change the query parameters without impacting other
modules. Additionally, the goal is that this architecture is extensible to accommodate
other applications. Regardless of the research application, if the researcher needs to
access device network activity, they can simply request the information from the cube.
The cube can build the request into a query to extract the appropriate data from the
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database and send this data back to researcher’s application.

Section 4.4

Database
The database component is the central repository of parsed network activity. As
mentioned in Section 4.3, the cube writes to the database (via the storage module)
as it receives network data from the cubelets, and the cube also queries the database
(via the integration module) if an application requests network or device information.
To live on a resource-constrained device in a smart home setting, we envision
the database to be fast, self-contained and have a small memory footprint. Finally,
the database should be well-suited to hold network data, which we envision to be
structured with distinct fields.
4.4.1. Support of Architecture Attributes
The database will grow as network data is written to the database. To scale the
database and support this growth, we envision the database to be housed on a device
with enough flash memory to allow storage of the large quantity of network information. We describe the storage requirements in more detail in Section 6.4. Regardless
of the amount of memory, the database will eventually grow to exceed the memory
capacity. As described in Section 4.3.4, we envision a data disposal module to contain
the database size and facilitate scalability.
The database is also extensible because the schema of the database can be modified
to accommodate di↵erent applications. The schema model depends directly on the
type of data that needs to be stored and that is required by an application. We
envision that the SPLICEcube developer may adjust the schema and add more tables
as appropriate.
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Implementation
In this section, we describe our implementation choices in building an initial prototype for the proposed architecture. We discuss the cubelets, cube, and database
components and the modules within each component.

Section 5.1

Cubelets
In our implementation, there are three cubelets. Each cubelet is a Raspberry Pi 4
or Raspberry Pi 3 running Raspberry Pi OS. There is no specific reason why we
use di↵erent models of Raspberry Pi; we simply used what was available and any
Raspberry Pi model that satisfied the cubelet component architecture requirements
identified in Section 4.2 would have sufficed.
As shown in Figure 5.1, each cubelet contains a dual-band BrosTrend Wi-Fi
adapter [8] plugged into the Pi via USB to sni↵ Wi-Fi packets. Please see section Section 4.2.1 for details about the use of the Wi-Fi adapter. Each cubelet also
contains an internal wireless interface (built into the Pi 3 and Pi 4) for transmitting
data to the cube via Wi-Fi. This interface supports both the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz
Wi-Fi bands so it can associate to networks that operate on either frequency band.
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Figure 5.1: Cubelet Prototype. The cubelet prototype consists of a Raspberry
Pi 3 or 4 and an external Wi-Fi adapter.
Each cubelet has three primary functions, which we separate into modules: WiFi frame detection (capturer module), Wi-Fi frame parsing (parser module), and
transmission to the cube (transmitter module). We create a separate thread for each
of these modules so that they can run concurrently, as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Cubelet Threads. The executing threads of each cubelet are the capturer thread, the parser thread, and the transmitter thread.
Over the course of the project, we revised the design of the cubelets functionality
to make the implementation scalable and extensible. Below we describe and justify
the design decisions for each module.
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5.1.1. Thread 1: Capturer
Create sniffing interface. As mentioned, we use an external dual-band Wi-Fi
adapter to sni↵ Wi-Fi packets in monitor mode. The built-in Wi-Fi interface on
the Raspberry Pi is only capable of capturing packets in managed mode. Sniffing in
managed mode means that an interface can only receive packets sent to/from the
interface that is sniffing. In contrast, sniffing in monitor mode allows an interface to
sni↵ all packets over the air that are within range even if the packets are not from,
or addressed to, the interface. Since we would like to capture information from all
devices within range, monitor mode is the appropriate mode for sniffing.
To capture network traffic with the Raspberry Pi cubelet, we first set the mode
of the Wi-Fi adapter to monitor mode and then use tcpdump [45], a packet capture
program, to continuously capture Wi-Fi packets.
Capture 802.11 frames. The sni↵er operates at the Medium Access Control
(MAC) sublayer of the Data Link Layer (Layer 2) within the OSI model, as shown
in Figure 5.3. This means that the type of data the sni↵er captures are 802.11 MAC
frames.

Figure 5.3: Data Link Layer. The Data Link Layer consists of the LLC and MAC
sublayers [16].
As shown in Figure 5.4, each 802.11 MAC frame contains a MAC header, a frame
body, and a frame check sequence (FCS).
The MAC header is unencrypted; the frame body encapsulates all information
from higher layers (LLC sublayer, Network layer, Transport layer, Application Layer
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Figure 5.4: 802.11 MAC Frame Format. A 802.11 MAC frame consists of the
MAC header, the frame body, and the frame check sequence [27].
etc.) and is typically encrypted; the FCS is an error-detecting code and is unencrypted. Additionally, the Wi-Fi adapter that we use to perform the frame capture
adds an unencrypted pseudo-header called “RadioTap” to each frame it captures. The
RadioTap [35] header is not part of the 802.11 frame structure, but it is a common
mechanism for drivers to supply additional information about received frames, such
as the channel frequency and data rate.
Write frames into named pipe. Thread 1 writes each captured frame directly
to a named pipe. By using a named pipe, Thread 1 can sni↵ and write to the pipe,
while Thread 2 simultaneously reads the bytes from the pipe for further analysis (see
Section 5.1.2).
Design Decisions for Capture Module.
(a) Sniffing tool: We initially used Scapy [37], a Python packet manipulation program, to sni↵ Wi-Fi packets. Scapy, however, is slow and misses packets when
network traffic is high, so its lackluster (albeit convenient) performance necessitated the switch to tcpdump.
(b) Named pipe: Thread 1 can write to the named pipe as Thread 2 reads from it.
A queue would also have allowed this FIFO functionality, but we choose to use
a named pipe because it is easy to redirect the output of tcpdump to a named
pipe. Please see Section 5.1.2 for additional justification of our decision choice.
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5.1.2. Thread 2: Parser
Read frames from named pipe. As Thread 1 sni↵s frames and writes them to
the named pipe, Thread 2 reads each frame from the named pipe using a Python
library called dpkt [11]. Thread 2 utilizes the dpkt.pcap.Reader function to iterate
through each frame in the pipe and perform the parsing.
Parse frames and extract fields. For each frame, Thread 2 parses the RadioTap header and extracts the following fields: received signal strength indicator
(RSSI), channel frequency, and data rate. Then the thread parses the MAC header of
the 802.11 frame and extracts the following fields: source MAC address, destination
MAC address, frame type, frame subtype, fragment number, and sequence number.
Figure 5.5 shows the fields of a MAC header.

Figure 5.5: MAC Header Format. The MAC header is unencrypted and contains
several fields describing the frame information [28].
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Thread 2 adds each extracted field, as a text string, to a Python list, and then
appends a delimiter character (|) to signify the end of the frame for future parsing.
Below is an example of a parsed frame. The timestamp field is not part of the extracted information, but it represents the time at which the dpkt.pcap.Reader function
reads the frame.
# src mac, dst mac, timestamp, pkt type, pkt subtype, fragment,
sqn num, rssi, channel freq, rate, delimiter
[60f81da9236a,80cc9c2c84e8,2022.04.14.16.29.58.838484,0,8,15,4192,-45,
5240,48,|]
The fields we choose to extract only represent part of a Wi-Fi frame’s full information. For example, we extract the information required for the Inside-Outside
application (RSSI, timestamp, source MAC address, destination MAC address) and
several other fields that provide basic information about the frame. There are, however, many more fields contained within the unencrypted RadioTap and MAC headers,
and it is possible for the SPLICEcube developer to extend this work and extract more
information as necessary using the dpkt library.
As mentioned previously, the frame body of the 802.11 frame is typically encrypted, since the Wi-Fi network being used by the transmitting device is usually
protected with a password. The frame body encapsulates all the packet information
from higher layers, so it contains a lot of useful information about a device’s network
behavior (source and destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, etc.).
However, unlike the RadioTap header and MAC header, parsing the frame body requires the data to be decrypted. This decryption process is left to future development,
but we give several suggestions about how to approach this problem in Section 7.1.2.
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Add extracted information to thread-safe queue. Thread 2 appends the list
to a thread-safe queue. So, each item in the queue is a list containing the contents (as
a text string) of a single parsed and extracted Wi-Fi frame. Thread 3 then reads this
FIFO queue and collects the queue items to transmit to the cube (see Section 5.1.3).
Design Decisions for Parser Module.
(a) Packet reading: We experimented with di↵erent tools such as PyShark [34],
Pcapreader [38], and rdpcap [38], but these were too slow in parsing the vast
volume of data being captured in monitor mode. dpkt proved to be the fastest
parsing tool; speed in parsing is important to avoid bottlenecks that may occur
during high network activity. dpkt’s speed ensures that the architecture can
scale appropriately even with a large number of devices in the home. dpkt is
also robust enough to fully dissect a Wi-Fi frame since it has parsing support
for all packet layers. This extensibility is important because the SPLICEcube
developer should be able to extract more bits of data from a frame, if required
by a future research application that is being integrated into SPLICEcube.
(b) Named pipe vs. queue: Thread 1 writes sni↵ed frames into a named pipe,
but Thread 2 writes the extracted frame information into a thread-safe queue.
Named pipes and queues are both FIFO and provide an avenue for transfer of
data between threads, so one might question the choice of one over the other.
A named pipe is accessed as a regular file. The dpkt reader (which reads frames
from the named pipe) requires a file as input, so it makes sense to use a named
pipe. The extracted frame information could have been written into a named
pipe; using a queue was simply an easy choice for an initial implementation.
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5.1.3. Thread 3: Transmitter
Dequeue items from queue. As Thread 2 adds the extracted fields to the threadsafe queue, Thread 3 periodically dequeues items from the queue.
Transmit items to queue. Thread 3 transmits to the cube via Wi-Fi. There are
two conditions under which Thread 3 transmits the current contents of the queue by
dequeuing items. The first condition is if the queue reaches a “maximum size”, which
we define as a parameter and which can be modified by the SPLICEcube developer.
The second condition is if the queue has not reached the maximum size but a certain
amount of time, which we also define as a parameter and which can be modified by the
SPLICEcube developer, has elapsed since the cubelet transmitted to the cube. One
can imagine a scenario in which there is sparse network activity so the cubelets are
not capturing many frames and subsequently, each cubelet’s queue is being populated
slowly. If a cubelet has not communicated with the cube in the amount of time set
by the parameter, then the cubelet transmits the current contents of the queue to the
cube.
When one of the above conditions is met, each item in the queue, which is a list
containing the extracted information for a captured Wi-Fi frame, gets dequeued and
the contents of each list are concatenated together to form a long string. Below is an
example of two items in the queue and the “long string” of concatenated data after
both items get dequeued.
% queue containing two items
[[60f81da9236a,80cc9c2c84e8,2022.04.14.16.29.58.838484,0,8,15,4192,-45,
5240,48,|],[80cc9c2c84e8,18b43060d4a0,2022.04.14.16.29.58.841057,2,0,15,
24672,-53,5240,12,|]]

30

5.1 Cubelets

Implementation

% string to be sent to cube (delimiter character separates each frame)
60f81da9236a,80cc9c2c84e8,2022.04.14.16.29.58.838484,0,8,15,4192,-45,
5240,48,|80cc9c2c84e8,18b43060d4a0,2022.04.14.16.29.58.841057,2,0,15,
24672,-53,5240,12,|
Then this string is encoded in a UTF-8 format and sent to the cube as a UDP
datagram. The maximum size of a single UDP datagram is 65,535 bytes (8 byte
UDP header + 65,527 bytes of data). And the actual limit for the data length,
which is imposed by the underlying IP protocol, is 65,507 bytes (65,535 bytes - 8
byte UDP header - 20 byte IP header). This means that if the length of the data
exceeds this maximum size, the data would get sent in chunks of 65,507 bytes. Since
the UDP protocol is “unreliable” and does not guarantee delivery, it is possible that
a datagram could be lost during transmission. To avoid losing 65,507 bytes worth
of network activity, we opt to instead divide the data into smaller datagrams. The
current datagram size in the program is set as a constant of 3000 bytes, but this
can easily be modified by the SPLICEcube developer. Having smaller datagrams
increases the overhead by increasing the number of transmissions but it minimizes
the loss of data in the event of UDP packet loss.
Further, we ensure that we send only as many complete frames that can fit in a
single datagram, given the datagram size set by the SPLICEcube developer. This
approach ensures that a parsed frame is not split across two transmissions. To avoid
IP layer fragmentation of the datagram, the SPLICEcube developer could limit the
datagram size to 1 MTU.
Design Decisions for Transmission Module.
(a) Wi-Fi transmission: We choose to use Wi-Fi for cubelet-cube communication
over a network because it enables wireless communication. Alternatives such
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as Ethernet or powerline network could be used, but would require cables and
are not ideal for a smart home environment, especially if the resident wishes to
move cubelets to another location in the home.
(b) Transport layer protocol: Before UDP, we initially implemented the Message
Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol [29], a messaging protocol
based on a publisher-subscriber model. MQTT is lightweight, efficient, and
is built for small, resource-constrained clients. It can scale to connect with
millions of IoT devices, it is built on top of the TCP/IP stack and has reliable
message delivery, and it enables security by allowing encryption of messages and
authentication of clients. In our implementation, the cubelets acted as publishers and published their parsed frames. The cube’s router module acted as the
broker and forwarded the published data to the database, which acted as the
subscriber.
Although the MQTT protocol is convenient and provides certain advantages, it
is primarily used by IoT devices to transmit relatively small-sized messages (a
few hundred bytes) and is not designed for the large volume of network data
that a cubelet must transmit to the cube. In fact, we were unable to send data
of more than a few thousand bytes via MQTT.
Additionally, some of MQTT’s features are unnecessary for our purpose. MQTT
relies on the TCP protocol for data transmission. TCP’s reliable message delivery is unnecessary for cubelet-cube communication. Most devices emit packets
frequently and the cubelets are continuously monitoring network activity. A
dropped transmission from a cubelet to the cube is not necessarily consequential. Acknowledgement or retransmission of the data is typically unnecessary
and wasteful of bandwidth.
On the other hand, UDP does not provide reliable delivery, does not encrypt
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messages, does not guarantee in-order sequence of delivery, and has a small
header size. As a low-overhead protocol, UDP is more suitable for cubelet-cube
communication.
(c) Encryption: In our implementation, the cubelet transmissions occur over the
cube’s Wi-Fi network, which is protected by Wi-Fi Protected Access Version 2
(WPA2), a strong wireless security protocol [48] that provides confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity. Hence, the extracted information of each sni↵ed
Wi-Fi frame, which becomes the frame body in a cubelet-cube transmission, is
already encrypted via WPA2 and does not require additional encryption. An
adversary would need to 1) know the password of the cube’s Wi-Fi network
and 2) capture the handshake between the cubelet and the cube during the
cubelet’s initial association with the network, to be able to decrypt the cubelet
transmissions.

Section 5.2

Cube
In our prototype, we implement the cube’s router module on one device and the other
three cube modules (reception, storage, disposal, and integration) on another device.
As shown in Figure 5.6, both devices together make up the cube, but for clarity, we
henceforth refer to the device hosting the router module as the router device and the
device hosting the other four cube modules as the collector device.
The collector device is a Raspberry Pi 3B+ running Raspberry Pi OS. The collector contains the reception module and its internal wireless interface (built into the
Pi 3B+), is used to receive cubelet transmissions over Wi-Fi. This interface supports both the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi bands so it can associate to networks that
operate on either frequency. The collector also hosts the database; we discuss the
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implementation of this structure in more detail in Section 5.3.1. The router device is
a Raspberry Pi 4 running OpenWrt, which is an open-source software primarily used
on embedded devices to route network traffic [33]. The router’s network is protected
by WPA2, and the collector is connected to the router’s network.

Figure 5.6: Cube Prototype. The cube prototype consists of the router device and
the collector device. Each of these devices is a Raspberry Pi 3 or 4.
We use two di↵erent devices because OpenWrt is tailored specifically to provide
router functionality, so it has limited storage and a limited package system that makes
it difficult to install certain packages (Git, SQLite3, etc.). On the other hand, Raspberry Pi OS is a robust distribution and o↵ers many packages for easy development.
There is no specific reason why we use di↵erent Pi models (Pi 3B+ vs. Pi 4) for the
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two devices. We simply used what was available, and any Raspberry Pi model that
supports the cube component architecture requirements would have sufficed.
In a real deployment, we could imagine two separate pieces of hardware for the
router and the collector, but perhaps contained within the same physical enclosure.
So, the user would just see one box (the cube), but inside there would be two motherboards to accommodate the separate functions.
The router device requires an Internet connection to be functional. This means
that the WAN interface (USB port) of the Raspberry Pi router must be connected
to an Ethernet port to provide an Internet connection. There are several options to
acquire an Internet connection via Ethernet – one can connect the Pi to an existing
home router, to a wall/floor Ethernet port (which is, in turn, connected to a router), or
to the Internet service provider (ISP) modem. The WAN interface then dynamically
receives an IP address from the ISP. The LAN interface of the cube router is set
to be on a separate subnet (we set a static IP address of 192.168.9.1), so that all
Wi-Fi clients that connect to the cube’s network receive an IP address on this subnet
via OpenWrt’s DHCP implementation. In a real deployment, we can imagine that
the cube router would be the true home router. In our prototype, we create our
own router with OpenWrt and deploy a separate Wi-Fi network instead of using an
existing home router and its existing network, to avoid interference with existing
infrastructure. Additionally, setting up a separate Wi-Fi network for the cube gives
us more flexibility for testing since we can control what devices are connected to the
cube’s network at all times.
Besides acting as a router, the cube has four primary functions: receiving parsed
data from cubelets (reception module), communicating with the database to store
the parsed data (storage module), transferring data from the database to the cloud
(disposal), and communicating with the database to retrieve necessary information
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Figure 5.7: Cube Threads. The executing threads of the cube are the reception
thread, the storage thread, and the integration thread.
for applications requesting network data (integration module).
We implemented three modules (reception, storage, and integration), and left the
disposal module for future work. As shown in Figure 5.7, we create a separate thread
for each of these three modules so that they can run concurrently. Note that these
threads run on the collector device.
As with the cubelets, we iteratively revised the design of the cube’s functionality
to make the implementation scalable and extensible. Below we describe and justify
the design decisions for each implemented module.
5.2.1. Thread 1: Reception
Receive parsed frame data from cubelets. We use a single thread (Thread 1)
to receive data from all the cubelets via an open UDP socket. It is possible that
a cubelet transmission arrives while Thread 1 is still in the process of receiving a
previous transmission. The datagram of the more recent transmission will simply
be placed in the OS receive bu↵er until the next call to ‘recvfrom()’, at which point
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Thread 1 will read the entire datagram from the bu↵er.
If the receive bu↵er on the socket is full when a datagram arrives, this datagram
will be dropped.
Add received data to thread-safe queue. When Thread 1 receives a message
from a cubelet, it appends the message and the IP address of the transmitting cubelet
as a tuple to a thread-safe queue.
Design Choices for Reception Module.
(a) One thread for reception: As mentioned, it is possible that a datagram arrives
while the receive bu↵er on the thread’s socket is full, which would cause the
datagram to be dropped. Implementing a separate thread to receive from each
transmitting cubelet could minimize the dropped datagrams since each thread’s
receive bu↵er would fill up less frequently. We, however, choose not to implement multiple reception threads because a dropped datagram is not normally
consequential. Since devices emit packets frequently and cubelets transmit to
the cube frequently, the loss of a single datagram is not significant given the
vast amount of network activity.
5.2.2. Thread 2: Storage
Dequeue items from queue. As Thread 1 receives datagrams and adds them
to the queue, Thread 2 continuously dequeues items from the queue to store in the
database. Each item is a string containing multiple frames’ extracted Wi-Fi information. Below is an example of a queue item containing 3 frames.
% datagram containing 3 frames
3656eec73483,ffffffffffff,2022.04.14.16.45.35.331970,0,8,15,12304,-72,
5240,12,|4056eec73483,ffffffffffff,2022.04.14.16.45.35.332500,0,8,1,
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28736,-73,5240,12,|
When Thread 2 removes an item from the queue, it parses the item to separate
each frame. The thread also parses each frame to separate the di↵erent Wi-Fi fields.
Insert items into database’s tables. A SQL statement inserts all the frames’
information into the database according to the database schema. See Section 5.3.2
for details regarding the database insert operation.
Design Choices for Storage Module.
(a) Queue: A queue is FIFO, allows multiple thread access, and was an easy choice
for an initial implementation. A named pipe could also have been used.
5.2.3. Thread 3: Integration
In our current implementation, we focus the integration module functionality on
accommodating the Inside-Outside application. We chose the Inside-Outside application [14] as the first application to intgerate with the SPLICEcube system because
we thought it would be a valuable addition to the SPLICEcube as a security research
application. Additionally, this project is internal to our lab at Dartmouth College,
so we had convenient access to the project code and resources.
Gralla’s Inside-Outside application uses machine-learning algorithms to detect
whether a target device is physically located inside or outside the house [14]. The
system consists of three (or more) observers that act as Wi-Fi sni↵ers and a home hub
that processes the collected data. The observers measure the received signal strength
indicator (RSSI) for frames received from the target device. The observers send their
observations to the home hub, which uses the RSSI data to train a classifier.
The SPLICEcube system is generally well-suited to integrate the Inside-Outside
application. The cubelets act as observers, sniffing real Wi-Fi frames that have been
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transmitted by home devices and extracting RSSI (among other fields) from the
frames. The cubelets periodically transmit the extracted information to the cube’s
collector. The collector acts as the home hub, storing the received information in the
database.
Let us now imagine that a researcher wants to run the Inside-Outside application
on their machine to detect whether a particular target device is inside or outside the
home at some given time. To accomplish this, the Inside-Out application must be
able to communicate with the SPLICEcube remotely. The cube’s integration module
handles this communication, as described below.
Receive query request from application. The application establishes a TCP
connection with the cube’s collector device and sends a query consisting of some
parameters. Thread 3 on the collector accepts the TCP connection and receives the
application query. The Inside-Outside application requires the following parameters
to classify a device as inside or outside the house: a list of MAC addresses of the
target devices, a list of the cubelet/observer IP addresses to consider, the end time,
and the start time. Below is a code excerpt showing the parameters sent by the
Inside-Outside application.
mac_list = ["60f81da9236a"]
cubelet_list = ["192.168.9.130", "192.168.9.203", "192.168.9.219"]
end_time = datetime.utcnow().strftime("%Y.%m.%d.%H.%M.%S.%f")
start_time = (datetime.strptime(end_time,
"%Y.%m.%d.%H.%M.%S.%f") - timedelta(seconds=TIME_WINDOW)).strftime(
"%Y.%m.%d.%H.%M.%S.%f")
One challenge is to ensure that each frame that is emitted by the target device is
associated with a fixed location. This association is necessary because it is important
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to know which cubelets observed frames from a particular transmission location, and
which cubelets missed those frames. Cubelets farther from the target’s location will
observe a low RSSI value or miss more frames emitted by the target when it is
in that same location, due to attenuation of the Wi-Fi signal. Our Inside-Outside
experimental setup relies on observed RSSI data from di↵erent transmission locations
to train its machine-learning model.
One potential method to ensure that cubelets receive a frame associated with a
fixed location is to keep track of the timestamps at which a frame is received by a
cubelet. If multiple cubelets receive a frame at the exact same time, then it means
that these cubelets received that frame from the same transmission location. This
method, however, requires high granularity of the timestamps and precise clock synchronization among all the cubelets. Another potential method to align frames is to
use a frame feature (or a combination of frame features) that uniquely distinguishes
each frame. In the end, however, we decided that it is not necessary to verify that
multiple cubelets see the same frame each time. If the time window of detection is
small enough, then we can assume that the target device did not move in that window
and that each frame received by the cubelets in that time window has been transmitted from the same location. The application currently requests a time window of 15
seconds, i.e., the time di↵erence between the start time and the end time parameters
is 15 seconds. In our experiment, we ensure that the target device is stationary in
this time window. In future work, shorter time windows and non-stationary devices
may be explored.
The researcher can provide any number of target devices and any number of
cubelets as parameters to the Inside-Outside application. For example, the researcher
may want to consider the impact that using only two observers has on the classification of the physical location of the target. So, the researcher would provide the IP
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addresses of only two cubelets in their query.
Query database to extract relevant data. Thread 3 builds a database query
based on the sent parameters and queries the database to extract the RSSI values
from the appropriate frames stored in the database. See Section 5.3.2 for details
regarding the database query operation.
It is possible that one or more cubelets observe fewer than 50 frames from the target in the specified time window. Thread 3 extracts from the database the maximum
number of frames (up to 50) that any of the cubelets observed in the time window. If
any of the other cubelets did not receive this same number of frames in the window,
then Thread 3 fills in an RSSI value of -100 for the frames that they missed. A more
negative value corresponds to a lower signal strength, so recording a value of -100
means that the cubelet missed some frames in the specified time window that were,
however, picked up by another cubelet. Let us say that in a time window of 15 seconds, cubelet A observes 30 frames from target X, cubelet B observes 20 frames from
target X, and cubelet C observes 10 frames from target X. The maximum number of
frames observed by any of the three cubelets is 30. Since cubelets B and C missed
some frames, Thread 3 records an RSSI value of -100 for the last 10 frames that
cubelet B missed and for the last 20 frames that cubelet C missed. This padding
means that the -100 is not necessarily aligned with the corresponding frames from
other cubelets. Although we decided that it is not necessary to match the same frame
across cubelets because we assume that the target device did not move in the given
time window, future work may use frame features such as frame length or FCS as
clues to match frames across cubelets.
Send extracted data back to application. After padding the missing frames
with -100 as necessary, Thread 3 then sends back the list of RSSI values for each
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cubelet to the Inside-Outside application. The application then populates a table
such that each row of the file corresponds to one frame and each column corresponds
to the measurements of one cubelet, as shown in Table 5.1.
ID

RSSI 1

RSSI 2

RSSI 3

1

-89

-45

-47

2

-100

-47

-44

3

-100

-51

-45

4

-100

-43

-46

Table 5.1: Merged Data Format in the Inside-Outside Application
The application then uses this data to train a machine-learning model that classifies the RSSI measurements.
Design Choices for Integration Module.
(a) Communication protocol: Contrary to the UDP connection used for cubeletcollector communication, we chose to use the TCP protocol for applicationcollector communication to ensure reliable delivery for the query request. In
case the request gets dropped, retrying is important so that the application can
obtain the information it needs.

Section 5.3

Database
In our implementation, the collector device hosts the database. We chose to use a
SQLite3 database, and we justify this design decision in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1. Database Structure
In our implementation, there are currently four database tables that contain the
parsed network data. We choose this table schema to reflect the four major entities
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that the data contains. Below we list the four database tables and delineate the
structure of the tables with an Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD).
(a) devices table: holds the MAC addresses of all seen devices and their corresponding manufacturers. “Seen devices” refers to devices whose emitted Wi-Fi
frames have been captured by a cubelet. The device manufacturer is found by
looking up the OUI ID (first six bytes of the MAC address) in a local text file
that lists the headquarter location of common device manufacturers.
(b) manufacturers table: holds the name of all seen device manufacturers and their
corresponding headquarters. The headquarters column is simply a placeholder
template for other columns that may be implemented in the future. The headquarters is found by referencing a local text file that lists the headquarter locations of common device manufacturers.
(c) cubelets table: holds the IP addresses of cubelets and their locations within the
home.
(d) frames table: holds the data transmitted by the cubelets (source device MAC
address, destination device MAC addresses, timestamp, packet type, packet
subtype, fragment number, sequence number, RSSI, channel frequency, and
rate) and some additional fields (source device manufacturer, destination device
manufacturer, and IP address of transmitting cubelet).
As shown in the ERD in Figure 5.8, each table has a primary key and the tables are linked to each other through foreign keys to enable SQL join statements.
The current table design provides a template for future development. For example,
the manufacturers table may not be particularly useful today, but there may be a
future research application that groups network traffic by manufacturer to baseline
device network activity based on the manufacturer. Further, the table design itself
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Figure 5.8: Database Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD). The ERD consists
of four tables: devices, manufacturers, cubelets, and frames.
is extensible to support the storage of additional data for a new network technology
or a new research application. For example, if cubelet functionality is expanded to
capture Bluetooth traffic, the SPLICEcube developer could add more database tables
to store Bluetooth data.
The frames table contains an index on the timestamp field, so that it is easy to
find the transmissions in a given time window. This is an integral part of the query
used by the Inside-Outside application, so finding transmissions quickly based on
timestamps makes query retrieval time much faster. As other research applications
are added, more indices may be added to the tables accordingly.
5.3.2. Database Inserts
Section 5.2.2 describes how the storage module within the cube’s collector device
dissects a cubelet transmission to separate each frame in the datagram. A SQL insert
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statement then writes the information in each frame into the di↵erent database tables
according to the database schema.
Instead of individually inserting the information within each frame information as
a row in a table, we implement the SQLite ‘executemany()’ method, which expedites
the process since it can add multiple rows in a single transaction. The SQLite ‘INSERT OR IGNORE ’ statement is used to discard an entry if the primary key already
exists in the table. This prevents duplicate device MAC addresses in the devices table, duplicate manufacturer names in the manufacturers table, duplicate cubelet IP
addresses in the cubelets table, and duplicate frames in the frames table. Below we
depict the statements used for insertion. Each ‘?’ symbol represents a field of the
table row that is being populated.
self.cursor.executemany(‘INSERT OR IGNORE INTO devices
VALUES(?, ?);’, devices_list)

self.cursor.executemany(‘INSERT OR IGNORE INTO manufacturers
VALUES(?, ?);’, manu_list)

self.cursor.executemany(‘INSERT OR IGNORE INTO cubelets
VALUES(?, ?);’, cubelets_list)

self.cursor.executemany(‘INSERT OR IGNORE INTO INTO frames
VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);’, frames_list)
5.3.3. Database Queries
Section 5.2.3 describes how the integration module within the collector processes an
application query request. A SQL select statement then queries the database to
extract information from the frames that match the query criteria.
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The example code below shows the query that extracts RSSI values for the InsideOutside application, when supplied a target device MAC address, a cubelet IP address, and a time window.
self.cursor.execute("SELECT rssi FROM frames WHERE src_mac = ? AND
cubelet_ip = ? AND timestamp >= ? AND timestamp <= ?", (mac, cubelet,
start_time, end_time))
5.3.4. Design choices for database
(a) SQLite3: SQLite is a relational database, as opposed to a NoSQL database. A
relational database is well-suited to store structured data [44] such as captured
network data. A relational database also preserves the distinct relationships
within the decomposed network data.
SQLite is a file-based database, as opposed to a database engine. In a database
engine such as MySQL, there is a Relational Database Management Server
(RDBMS) that sits between the clients and the database and manages file
I/O, client connections, query optimization, query processing, and caching [20].
MySQL provides more functionality than SQLite such as authentication of users,
support for more data types, and increased scalability. However, MySQL has
a large memory footprint and contains a multitude of files [47]. In contrast,
SQLite has a low-memory footprint and is an embedded database so it can live
on its host device as a single file [47]. Since the SPLICEcube database may live
on a resource-constrained device in a smart home, a fast and lightweight setup
is more appropriate [43].
SQLite is also low overhead for the SPLICEcube developer since it is easy to
install and requires minimal administration [47]. SQLite’s simplicity makes it
a convenient choice for an initial implementation of the architecture.
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Finally, SQLite supports unlimited number of simultaneous readers, but it only
allows one writer at any instant in time [5], which is well-suited for the SPLICEcube system. The collector’s information storage module is the only entity that
writes to the database. In our current implementation of the proposed architecture, there is only one thread within the collector’s integration module that
can read from the database, so only one application can request network data
at a time. The SPLICEcube developer, however, could add more threads to
the integration module to support multiple applications requesting data at the
same time.
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Experimental Evaluation
Below we discuss two di↵erent experiments to evaluate our implementation.

Section 6.1

Experiment 1: Testing the System with the
Inside-Outside Application
Section 5.2.3 describes how we incorporate the Inside-Outside application into our
implementation of the SPLICEcube architecture. Below we discuss deploying this
combined system in a real home and evaluate its performance.
6.1.1. Testing Procedure
Setup. The experiment was conducted in a residential house, as shown in Figure 6.1.
None of the sides of the house were connected to any other buildings.
We used the following devices in this experiment:
(a) Cube, consisting of the router device and the collector device
(b) Three cubelets
(c) Target device (we used a Macbook Pro laptop)
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Figure 6.1: Experiment 1 Testing Site. A residential house was used as a smart
home environment.
(d) Device running Inside-Outside application (we used a laptop). We call this
device the application device.
To setup the cube, we connected the cube router to the existing home router’s
Ethernet port and placed the collector adjacent to it. We placed the cube on the first
floor in a central location of the house to maximize network coverage. We placed each
of the three cubelets in a di↵erent corner of the first floor of the house and made sure
they were connected to the cube’s Wi-Fi network. Finally, we placed the application
device inside the house and ensured it was connected to the cube’s network, as shown
in Figure 6.2.
The experiment consisted of three data collection runs. The first run collected data
when the target was placed at 30 di↵erent positions inside the house on the first floor.
The second run collected data when the target was placed at 15 di↵erent positions
inside the house on the second floor. The third run collected data when the target was
placed at 50 di↵erent positions outside the house. As shown in Figure 6.2 we created a
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map of the transmission locations (the positions where the target device was placed)
based on the home’s floor plan. Each transmission location was about 1.5 m apart
from each other. We also had the target device actively playing a few YouTube videos
to ensure that it would generate some network traffic.

Figure 6.2: Experiment 1 Testing Site Setup. The house floor plan shows the
location of the system components and the target’s transmission locations. R represents the location of the cube’s router device. C represents the location of the
cube’s collector device. C1, C2, and C3 represent the locations of the cubelets. The
yellow squares represent the transmissions locations on the first floor of the inside of
the house. The blue squares represent the transmission locations on the second floor
of the inside of the house. The green squares represent the transmission locations
outside the house.

Execution.
(a) We began operating the system. We started with the first data collection run –
the first floor of the house (denoted by the yellow squares in Figure 6.2).
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(b) We placed the target in the first transmission location of the current data collection run.
(c) We waited for approximately 1 minute with the target in this transmission
location. The waiting period was to ensure that 1) the target device had enough
time to emit Wi-Fi frames so the cubelets can capture some network activity
from the target in its current location and 2) the cubelets had enough time to
transmit their recently captured information to the collector.
(d) We sent a query request specifying the necessary parameters (the target MAC
address, the IP addresses of the three cubelets, and a 15 second time window) from the Inside-Outside application to the collector, as described in Section 5.2.3.
Since there were three cubelets in this experiment, the collector queried the
database three times to extract the RSSI values for the frames observed by
each of the three cubelets separately. For each query, the collector retrieved
the RSSI values from the 50 (or the maximum number available) most recent
frames that were observed by the specified cubelet and were transmitted by
the target within the 15 seconds prior to the time of query. The collector then
sent back the list of RSSI values for each cubelet to the application, and this
data was populated into a .csv file on the application device, as described in
Section 5.2.3.
(e) We then moved the target to the next transmission position and repeated steps
c-d for all the transmission locations of this data collection run.
(f) We then repeated steps b-e for the next data collection run – the second floor
of the house (denoted by the blue squares in Figure 6.2).

51

6.1 Experiment 1

Experimental Evaluation

(g) We then repeated steps b-e for the third data collection run – outside the house
(denoted by the green squares in Figure 6.2).
At the end of the three runs, the application device contained three .csv files, one
for each data collection run. We used this data to train and test the Inside-Outside
machine-learning model that classifies the RSSI measurements.
6.1.2. Results
Proof-of-concept. This experiment validates our prototype implementation and
demonstrates a successful proof-of-concept use of the SPLICEcube architecture. The
cubelets, cube, and database components worked in accordance with the proposed
architecture in a real home environment.
ML model results. The Inside-Outside application uses three supervised machinelearning classifiers: Decision Tree (DT), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), and Random
Forest (RF). Additionally, the application uses 5-fold cross-validation to evaluate each
classifier. We do not detail the machine-learning classifiers and evaluation methods
because they are specific to the application and out of scope of the contributions of
this thesis. We simply use the model as a black box to demonstrate an end-to-end
integration of the Inside-Outside application with our SPLICEcube implementation.
Below we present some of the model’s output metrics to illustrate the success of our
system.
Table 6.1 shows each classifier’s performance in predicting the target device’s
location when it was located inside the house. The Random Forest classifier performs
the best across all the metrics for both data collection samples and shows promising
results in classifying a device as inside or outside the home.
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Classifer

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

DT

0.913

0.897

0.867

0.881

KNN

0.763

0.677

0.700

0.686

RF

0.925

0.875

0.933

0.903

DT

0.877

0.769

0.667

0.714

KNN

0.862

0.688

0.733

0.710

RF

0.969

1.000

0.867

0.929

Table 6.1: Inside-Outside ML model accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 scores
Query time. It is important that query time stays low as the database grows in
size. If the execution time of a database query becomes a bottleneck, the application
will receive delayed responses after sending a query request to the collector.
To measure this, we logged the query retrieval time and the corresponding database
size for each request sent in the experiment. As mentioned, for each received query
request, the collector queries the database three times to extract the RSSI values for
the frames observed by each of the three cubelets separately. We sum up the three
query times to obtain the total query time for a request. As shown in Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, and Figure 6.5, there is no correlation between query time and the database
size in any of the three data collection runs. The total query time remains under 1
second for every query request. We do not define a goal query time since di↵erent
applications may require query responses within di↵erent time frames.
Because we placed an index on the timestamp field of the frames table, and each
query extracts a constant number of RSSI values in a specified time window, query
time should theoretically not increase significantly. The results of this experiment
validate this theory and confirm that the index on the timestamp field of the frames
table in the database is working correctly. We hypothesize that the spikes in query
time, visible in Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, and Figure 6.5, are the result of the database
reorganizing the index due to the addition of new data, as it processes a query. We
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test and validate this hypothesis in Section 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Experiment 1 Query Time Result for Data Collection Run #1.
This graph shows total query time vs. database size for data collection run #1 (first
floor of house).

Figure 6.4: Experiment 1 Query Time Result for Data Collection Run #2.
This graph shows total query time vs. database size for data collection run #2 (second
floor of house).
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Figure 6.5: Experiment 1 Query Time Result for Data Collection Run #3.
This graph shows total query time vs. database size for data collection run #3
(outside house).

Section 6.2

Experiment 2: Testing the System with
Controlled Tests
To test our implementation more extensively and gather more system metrics, we
also ran some controlled tests. These controlled tests were meant to let the system
run for a long period of time and periodically observe certain metrics as the system
collects and stores network data.
6.2.1. Testing Procedure
Setup. We used the following devices in this experiment:
(a) Cube, consisting of the router device and the collector device
(b) Three cubelets
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(c) Device running Inside-Outside application (we used a laptop). We call this
device the application device.
In contrast with Experiment 1 (Section 6.1), there was no specific target in this
experiment.
We ran this experiment at two di↵erent sites. The first site was the same residential house used in Experiment 1. The second site was a lab in the Center for
Engineering & Computer Science at Dartmouth College. Since a computer lab and a
residential home are di↵erent environments and contain di↵erent number of devices,
we chose to test both these locations to observe the di↵erence in the database size
and resulting insertion time and query time metrics as the system collected network
data.
We followed the same system setup as described in Experiment 1 by ensuring that
the cube router had Internet access, the cubelets were spread out across the testing
site, and the cubelets and application device were connected to the cube’s network.
Execution.
(a) We began operating the system so it was capturing, sending, storing, etc. We
made sure that the database was empty before starting the experiment.
(b) We sent a query request specifying the necessary parameters (the target MAC
address, the IP addresses of the three cubelets, and a 15 second time window)
from the Inside-Outside application to the collector, as described in Section
5.2.3. We arbitrarily selected one device on the home Wi-Fi network and used
its MAC address as the target MAC address parameter.
(c) We logged the database insertion time of all the frames in a single cubelet
transmission (one datagram sent from a cubelet to the cube). We chose not to
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log the insertion time for every cubelet transmission because it would add a lot
more overhead to the system and could distort our results.
(d) We repeated steps b and c about every 30 minutes, for a total of 4 hours.
6.2.2. Results
Query time. Similar to Experiment 1, there was no correlation between query time
and database size in both the home and lab tests (see Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7). The
database grew to about 1 GB in both tests. Apart from the initial spike in Figure 6.6,
the query time stays relatively constant, confirming that the index on the timestamp
field of the frames table is functioning correctly. The total query time represents the
sum of the duration of the three queries that the collector undertakes for a single
application query request. Once again, we hypothesize that the occasional spikes
in query time, visible in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, are the result of the database
reorganizing the index due to the addition of new data, as it processes a query. We
test and validate this hypothesis in Section 6.3.

Figure 6.6: Experiment 2 Query Time Result for the Home Site. This graph
shows the total query time vs. database size for the home testing site.
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Figure 6.7: Experiment 2 Query Time Result for the Lab Site. This graph
shows the total query time vs. database size for the lab testing site.
Insertion time. Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show the insertion time for a single
cubelet datagram at di↵erent points in the home experiment and lab experiment,
respectively. The insertion times stay low (less than 0.015 seconds) and relatively
constant even as the database grows in size. The amount of data being inserted into
the database each time was about 3000 bytes since we set the size of a cubelet-cube
transmission datagram to be 3000 bytes, as described in Section 5.1.3.
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Figure 6.8: Experiment 2 Insertion Time Result for the Home Site. This
graph shows the insertion time vs. database size for the home testing site.

Figure 6.9: Experiment 2 Insertion Time Result for the Lab Site. This graph
shows the insertion time vs. database size for the lab testing site.
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Section 6.3

Experiment 3: Testing Query Time with a
Constant Database Size
We hypothesize that the spikes in query time in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are
because the database is reorganizing the index due to the addition of new data, as
it processes a query. To test this hypothesis, we query the database while keeping
the database size constant. In other words, the cubelets are not transmitting to the
cube, and the cube is not adding any new data to the database. The database size
is about 1 GB. We remotely query the database 20 times from an application device
over the span of about 13 minutes, with varying amounts of time between each query.
We see in Figure 6.10 that the query times remain low and average about 0.055
seconds over the 20 trials. We can infer that there are no spikes in query time because
there is no addition of data, so the database does not need to rearrange the index.

Figure 6.10: Experiment 2 Query Time Result. This graph shows the query
times when the 1 GB database stays at a constant size.
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Section 6.4

General Storage Requirements
Table 6.2 shows some final statistics of the database after 4 hours of recording data
at each testing site.
Testing Site

Total Records

Total Size

Smart Home

4,737,225

953 MB

Computer Lab

5,161,737

1032 MB

Table 6.2: Database metrics after 4 hours of system operation
We see that for both testing sites, the database reached a size of about 1000 MB
(1 GB) after four hours of operation. In this experiment, the database was housed
on a Raspberry Pi with a 32 GB Samsung EVO Select microSD memory card [39]. If
we assume that the network conditions were to remain constant and that the other
programs on the Pi take up negligible memory, we can extrapolate and say that it
would take about 128 hours (a little over five days) for the database to completely fill
up the disk space. We envision that before reaching this storage threshold, the data
disposal module would transfer older data to the cloud and subsequently delete this
data from the database to free up space.
This experiment illustrates the general database storage requirements for two different network environments. Although the frequency of data uploads to the cloud
depends on the network conditions, this experiment provides the SPLICEcube developer insight to better manage the database storage requirement for a given amount
of device storage.
It is interesting that the amount of network data observed in a freestanding residential house was about the same as that observed in a busy computer lab in a
period of four hours. One possible explanation is that the access points in the house
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had lower beacon intervals than the access points in the lab, which would mean that
the access points in the house sent out beacon frames more frequently. More testing
would be helpful to further understand the network conditions for both the testing
sites.

Section 6.5

Experimental Support of Architecture Attributes
These experiments showcase that the architecture underpinning the SPLICEcube is
scalable and extensible. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we modified the integration module on the collector to enable three di↵erent queries for a single application
request, as required by the Inside-Outside application. Similarly, if other applications
were to be added, the architecture could be extended such that the SPLICEcube developer could tailor the collector to accommodate these applications as necessary.
Additionally, in Experiment 2, there were di↵erent number of devices and di↵erent
network traffic at the two testing sites, yet insertion and query times remained relatively stable, illustrating the scalability of the system.
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Future Work
The proposed architecture that underpins the SPLICEcube solution aims to be a
scalable and extensible framework to facilitate smart-home management, and our
current implementation serves as an initial prototype for this architecture. Below we
suggest several improvements to both the initial prototype implementation and the
overall architecture.

Section 7.1

Implementation Improvements
This section describes areas of future work to improve the current implementation of
the prototype.
7.1.1. Sni↵ on Multiple Channels
Each cubelet currently has one interface dedicated to sniffing and sni↵s on a single
channel. Capturing traffic on multiple channels is important in gathering a more
comprehensive sample of frames from the network and potentially detecting the presence of a rogue access point [10]. One approach is to add additional interfaces that
capture Wi-Fi packets on di↵erent channels across both bands of the Wi-Fi frequency
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spectrum. Another approach is to enable channel hopping on an interface so that the
sni↵er visits each channel periodically. An intelligent hopping strategy and an optimal hopping interval duration is important in maximizing packet collection and device
detection. Looping too slowly could result in missed information on other channels.
Looping too fast could result in extra overhead and delay due to excessive channel
switching. One possible option is to always monitor the router channel, and then
efficiently switch through the other channels. Deshpande et al. proposes a method
in which measurement applications can dynamically modify the sampling strategy to
refocus the monitoring system on certain types of traffic [10].
7.1.2. Decrypt MAC Frame Data
We discuss in Section 5.1.2 that our implementation can currently extract only the
RadioTap header and the MAC header from a layer 2 MAC frame. This is because
the home Wi-Fi devices are transmitting on the cube’s network, which is protected
by WPA2 in our implementation, so the frame body of the MAC frame is encrypted.
Since the frame body encapsulates all the information from the layers above, decrypting it would yield useful, higher-level information about a device’s transmissions. Below we have outlined the decryption process for WPA2 traffic and suggested
a potential approach.
Pre-Shared Key (PSK). To decrypt the layer 2 frame body of a device transmission, we first must know the password of the Wi-Fi network to which the device
is connected. The Wi-Fi password is known as the Pre-Shared Key (PSK). In our
implementation, the home Wi-Fi devices are connected to the cube’s network, and
the SPLICEcube developer would typically know the cube network’s Wi-Fi password.
As a result, we can only decrypt transmissions from devices that are connected to
the cube’s network. Transmissions from devices that are connected to some other
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password-protected Wi-Fi network cannot be decrypted since we do not know the
password of these networks.
Capturing Four-Way Handshake. Additionally, we must be able to capture
the four-way handshake that occurs when a device attempts to connect to the cube’s
network. The four-way handshake involves the exchange of random data, the authenticator nonce and supplicant nonce, between the client and the access point (AP)
every time a client associates [46].
In our implementation, the cubelets could be used to capture the key exchange
since they are actively sniffing. Whatever device is responsible for decrypting the
frame body must then have access to this key. For example, if the cubelets are
responsible for decrypting, then each cubelet must store the key for the duration of a
client’s connection to the network. Alternatively, the cube’s collector device could be
responsible for decrypting; as in, the cubelets could capture and transmit the data
to the collector in its encrypted form, and then the collector could decrypt it before
storing in the database. In this case, the collector would need access to the key. The
design decisions are left to the discretion of the SPLICEcube developer.
It is possible that a cubelet misses capturing the handshake when the client first
joins the network. In this case, we can implement a deauthentication attack to interrupt the connection between the client and the router [36]. The cube or a cubelet
can send a deauthentication frame to the client device that forces the device to disassociate from the network. We can then have the client join the network again and
capture the subsequent handshake.
7.1.3. Implement Disposal Module
In Section 4.3.4 of the proposed architecture, we envision a data disposal module in
the cube to contain the database size. Although we did not implement this module
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in our prototype, here is one potential approach.
The disposal module on the collector device could periodically check for data that
was written to the database prior to a certain time threshold. The module could then
use the SQLite dump utility to write this outdated data into a text file. Then the
module could upload this file to cloud storage and subsequently access the database
again to delete the data that has been migrated to the cloud.
7.1.4. Translate Code to C
All of the current code is written in Python, but it can be rewritten in C to increase
the speed of the programs and maximize efficiency. Python was a reasonable choice
for an initial implementation because it has low development cost and is easy to revise
if a design decision needs modification. For future iterations of the implementation,
it could make sense to write the lower-level capabilities such as sniffing, parsing,
transmission, reception, and database extraction in C. The presentation layer for
a GUI or front-end application may be written in a higher-level language at the
discretion of the SPLICEcube developer.
Although the architecture components will remain the same, some implementation
choices will need to be revised. For example, the current method for parsing Wi-Fi
frames utilizes the dpkt Python library which will need to be replaced if the code is
translated to C. The advantage is that C does have similar libraries for parsing, such
as libwifi [24], so the concept of extracting relevant features from the frames should
translate seamlessly.
7.1.5. Conduct More Robust Testing
Although the current experiments provide insight into the operation of the SPLICEcube system, further testing, such as observing the query and insertion times over a
longer period of time and more trials, could enhance our understanding of the current
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implementation.
One key metric that the current evaluation does not acknowledge is the throughput of data in the cubelet-cube transmissions. The approximate bytes sent per transmission and the approximate number of transmissions per minute could be helpful
metrics. The cubelet-cube transmissions occur on the cube’s Wi-Fi network and add
additional overhead to the network. To avoid a congested network, it is important to
ensure that these transmissions do not consume excessive bandwidth.
To detect devices and keep an accurate log of device network information, the
cubelets must be able to maximize capture performance and successful transmission
to the cube. If the cubelets cannot capture sufficient frames, they will miss device
activity. If the cubelets-cube transmissions get dropped frequently, the cube will not
receive data about device activity. The current evaluation does not measure capture
or transmission performance. We could evaluate capture performance by comparing
the cubelets’ captures with a high-performance, high-speed sni↵er. A simple test
to observe the number of frames captured by both systems over the span of a day
could provide insight into the cubelets’ capturing ability. Additionally, we could
evaluate cubelet transmission performance by adding a sequence number to each
UDP datagram sent to the cube, allowing us to observe the number of successful
transmissions and detect which datagrams were dropped.
7.1.6. Modify Database
In Section 5.3.4, we discussed that we chose to use SQLite, a file-based database,
as opposed to a database engine such as MySQL. SQLite was an easy initial implementation choice and its low-memory footprint makes it well-suited to live on a
resource-constrained device in a smart home. MySQL would provide more functionality because it requires a Relational Database Management Server (RDBMS) that
sits between the clients and the database and manages file I/O, client connections,
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query optimization, query processing, and caching [20].
Additionally, MySQL is widely used for online transactional processing (OLTP) [30].
An OLTP-based database includes 1) frequent data modification, 2) high volume of
concurrent users accessing data, 3) simple transactions, and 4) indexed data sets for
fast search, query, and retrieval [26]. An OLTP-based database is well-suited for the
SPLICEcube system: 1) there is frequent addition of network data to the SPLICEcube
database, 2) there may be multiple applications (represented by multiple threads in
the integration module) requesting data, 3) the SPLICEcube database operations are
relatively simple (inserts and simple queries), and 4) query response time is important
so that the application can receive its requested data quickly.
We leave such database design decisions to the future SPLICEcube developer, but
introduce MySQL as a potential alternative database.

Section 7.2

Architecture Improvements
This section describes areas of future work to improve the overall proposed architecture.
7.2.1. Expand Router Functionality
The proposed architecture does not specify additional capabilities for the router besides its routing functionality. Future iterations of the architecture could expand the
functionality of the cube’s router to allow the cube to also sni↵ frames. Indeed, because the router already receives frames from the home Wi-Fi clients, it could parse
the frames it is already handling and record the relevant features in the database.
The cubelets are still needed because we want more than one observation point. By
using the router as an additional observation location, we could gain more information
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about frames, which could be useful for applications such as device localization or
authentication.
7.2.2. Accommodate Other Applications
Although the Inside-Outside detection application, a type of device localization application, was successfully integrated into the SPLICEcube, there are many opportunities for other research applications to be integrated into the SPLICEcube to enhance
its robustness as the home’s central security and privacy controller. Some ideas of applications discussed in section Section 1.2 were device localization, network anomaly
detection, device firmware update, and cube interface design. The architecture may
need to be expanded to accommodate such other applications. Modifications are inevitable, but the current architecture provides the foundation for further development
to support the integration of other applications.
For example, the SPLICEcube is well-suited to accommodate a learning-based
network anomaly detection system that sni↵s network traffic, extracts certain parameters, and learns the “normal” behavior, to subsequently detect unexpected behavior.
However, the architecture may need to be extended to fully integrate such an application. For example, IoTHound, a learning-based network anomaly detection system
mentioned in Section 1.2, employs a data aggregation method to segment the observed
network traffic into time windows before feature extraction because having a single
data point for each observed packet becomes a computational burden and because
one single packet is usually not indicative of an IoT device behavior [3]. Although
the database in our proposed architecture would allow the IoTHound application to
retrieve necessary features from the stored network data, the database may need to
be extended to allow for data aggregation before extracting the features.
Additionally, a device firmware update process, such as one proposed by Nilsson
et al. in which the cube downloads new firmware and securely deploys it on a home
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device [32], will require a path of communication from the cube to the device. The
extensible nature of the architecture allows this expansion, and we envision adding
another module to the cube to handle this communication.
7.2.3. Support Other Protocols
Currently, the SPLICEcube architecture only supports Wi-Fi but can be expanded
to support other protocols such as Bluetooth and Zigbee. For example, a Bluetooth
sniffing interface can be added to each cubelet to allow detection of Bluetooth frames
emitted by Bluetooth devices. We envision a separate module to handle Bluetooth
frame capture. A Bluetooth parsing tool would be required to parse the Bluetooth and
frames and extract relevant information. We envision a separate module to handle
Bluetooth frame parsing. The cubelet’s transmission and the cube’s reception of the
parsed Bluetooth frames could occur within the existing transmission and reception
modules, respectively. Additional tables may be required in the database to store the
Bluetooth data in an organized and efficient way.
Supporting more protocols will allow the capture and storage of traffic from a
wider range of smart devices in the home that may communicate using protocols other
than Wi-Fi. Applications such as device localization or network anomaly detection
can then be used to secure and manage these non-Wi-Fi devices.
7.2.4. Incorporate Security as an Architecture Attribute
In addition to being scalable and extensible, the envisioned architecture must also
be secure. It is possible that an adversary targets the SPLICEcube system to gain
access to the home’s private information, so the SPLICEcube architecture must be
designed to protect against security exploits.
Communication channels that connect the SPLICEcube components must be secure. In our current implementation of the architecture, the application-cube and
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cubelet-cube communication occurs over the cube’s network which is protected by
WPA2. If a future SPLICEcube developer chooses to modify the communication
protocol, they must think about how to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication of the transmitted data.
There must be a robust method to authenticate the devices and services that
communicate with the cube and ensure the integrity of information added to the
database. Any device on the cube’s network can currently send information to the
cube that could subsequently be stored in the database. More protective measures
are needed to disallow such communication.
7.2.5. Optimize the Positioning of the Cubelets
The current architecture stipulates the use of multiple cubelets and expects the
cubelets to be dispersed around the smart home to provide several observation points
during network data capture. An extension of the architecture could be to explore
the optimal number of cubelets and the optimal positions for the cubelets to maximize coverage. Farkas et al. propose an algorithm to find the optimal number and
placement of WLAN access points for indoor positioning [18]. Similar work could be
done to find the optimal setup for the cubelets.
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Conclusion
To realize the vision of a manageable and secure smart-home environment, we propose
a system called the SPLICEcube, which consists of the cube, cubelets, and database.
The cube acts as a router and central hub, the cubelets extend network coverage and
assist in gathering network data, and the database stores network data.
In this thesis, we design a scalable and extensible Wi-Fi architecture and database
that underpins the SPLICEcube. The architecture facilitates intelligent research applications to be integrated into the SPLICEcube to expand the functionality of the
system. The architecture is designed to capture network data across the smart home,
parse the network data for desired information, consolidate this information into a
central repository, and allow applications to use the stored information to securely
manage the devices within the home.
We built a prototype implementation of the proposed architecture and integrated
the Inside-Outside research application with our implementation. We tested our implementation by deploying the SPLICEcube system in a real environment to demonstrate a successful proof-of-concept use of the SPLICEcube architecture. The integrated Inside-Outside application operated successfully and showed promising results
in classifying home devices as inside or outside the home.
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Conclusion

The SPLICEcube system can serve as a platform for researchers to test research
applications that a resident within a smart home may then use to secure and manage
their smart home. Our implementation may become obsolete as technology evolves,
but we envision the proposed SPLICEcube architecture to remain a scalable and
extensive framework for identifying, securing, and managing smart devices.
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